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LAW’S JUDGEMENT: SOME THOUGHTS*EL JUICIO DEL DERECHO: ALGUNAS REFLEXIONESWilliam Lucy**
Summary: I. Amalia on Virtue and Community. II. Rodrigo’s Ques-
tions. III. Haris’s Tension.
My first thought is gratitude: I’m grateful to Amalia Amaya, Rodrigo 
Camarena Gonzalez and Haris Psarras and for taking the time and trouble to engage with Law’s Judgement.1 Academic lives seem to be 
increasingly busy and the time needed to live that kind of life —to 
read, think, talk and teach— is under pressure from various perfor-mance metrics and indicators.2 So: I appreciate them making time. I 
am also grateful for the opportunity to think again about some of the 
arguments in the book, provoked by their interesting and insightful thoughts and comments. What follows are my thoughts on some of their thoughts.
I. Amalia on Virtue and Community 
I think that modern law’s judgment —the way in which we, law’s ad-
dressees, are assessed by its multiplicity of standards— is abstract. 
And a brief way of unpacking what I mean by ‘abstract’ is: it ignores a 
great deal about our conduct, characters and context when it judges 
* Artículo recibido el 15 de agosto de 2018 y aceptado para su publicación el 27 de noviembre de 2018.
** Law School, Durham University; w.n.lucy@durham.ac.uk. 
1  Hart Publishing 2017.
2  Two academics have made time to write about this: M Berg & B Seeber, The 
Slow Professor (University of Toronto Press 2016). 
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us. Now, I presume that Amalia doesn’t disagree with this as an em-
pirical claim, that she accepts that law’s abstract judgment (herein-after LAJ) is an obvious but not ubiquitous feature of the major mod-
ern legal systems. But it is absolutely plain that she doesn’t like it. I’m 
not certain that I like it either, but I set myself to examine what might be said in its favour in the latter part of Law’s Judgement. My aim was not to provide an all-round defence of LAJ; it was, rather, to see if we could add ballast to the argumentative scales and incline them a little in LAJ’s favour. So, although Amalia takes me to offer a ‘jus-
tification’ for LAJ, I do not see my own arguments in that way if we 
mean by ‘justification’ something like this: an argument or series of arguments which show LAJ is of overwhelming importance or value.3 For Amalia, LAJ is, it seems, of no moral or political value. That is 
because abstract judgement is not virtuous judgement. The virtuous 
judge sees “the whole picture, perceives all the morally and legally 
salient features of the case and miss[es] nothing of relevance”; she 
is “emotionally attached to the parties [and] will describe and re-
describe the case in all its particularity”; she can “specify the values 
at stake in ways that make them applicable to the situation at hand” and will revise those values when necessary to avoid absurdity or 
injustice. I have no problem with this as a possible and plausible 
characterisation of what virtuous judgement might look like in the abstract, or at large. I’m sure that openness to all possible relevant 
considerations when making decisions, emotional engagement with the parties affected by one’s decisions and sensitivity to the values in play in decisions are, in general, commendable. 
But this picture of virtuous judgement is not a picture of legal 
judgement (or even that narrow subfield of it which consists of ap-
pellate courts deciding hard cases) in any of the jurisdictions with which I am familiar.4 One thing that looms large —overpoweringly 
3  Whereas Amalia takes me to be offering a full justification for LAJ, another 
reader of the book suggests that my examination of LAJ’s value is altogether too 
tentative: H Passas, Book Review (2018) 77 Cambridge Law Journal 423-427 at 427. 
4  I would not now say, as I once did, that this replaces law’s judgement with an-
other, more ethically sensitive form of judgement: see W. Lucy, Book Review (1999) 19 Legal Studies at 427-428 and Alan Norrie’s reply at 231-234 of his Punishment, 
Responsibility and Justice (Clarendon Press 2000). 
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so— in that limited subfield of legal judgement, but which features 
only fleetingly in Amalia’s characterisation of virtuous judgement is 
this: the law. That is, the legal doctrines, principles and rules, along-side their alleged underpinning values, the interpretation or appli-
cation of which is the subject matter of the dispute in an appellate court hard case. It is exactly those principles and rules which pre-
vent judges from being virtuous, in Amalia’s sense: they stop judges seeing the whole picture, they exclude some or many or possibly all of the morally salient features of the case and they constitute 
an interpretive straight-jacket through which the case must be de-
scribed (so it cannot, legally speaking, be ‘redescribed’). The cases I mentioned in Law’s Judgement to highlight the ‘moral jolt’ that LAJ 
presents illustrate just this kind of exclusion and limitation; they are shorthand means of highlighting LAJ’s morally troublesome nature. I disagree with Amalia, for now at least, about how we should respond to this: she responds by replacing LAJ with LVJ (law’s vir-
tuous judgment) whereas I attempt to examine what moral or po-litical weight LAJ might have despite its morally troubling features. 
This disagreement could well be temporary, since it is not certain that LAJ will, in the end, pass muster in moral and political terms; it might have some such credit but that might not be enough to out-weigh its moral and political debits. I, however, have not yet given up on LAJ and so cannot endorse LVJ. 
As to community, we are in agreement, subject to one caveat. I ar-gue in chapter 6 of Law’s Judgement that LAJ embodies or supports a fairly thin form of community which, as Amalia notes, is egalitarian. It is not “a community in which people are bounded by affective ties and in which there are relations of mutual aid and reciprocal ser-
vice”. I agree with Amalia that that is a worthy ideal, a form of com-munity worth striving for and worth maintaining where it exists. 
The kind of community that LAJ creates is thinner than that, but not 
without moral standing; furthermore, that thin kind of community 
may well be a first step to the realisation of thicker, morally more 
appealing forms of community. The caveat is this: I do not think that our efforts to realise morally appealing forms of community is a zero-sum game, such that realising a thin form of community in 
some contexts (the juridical, for example) makes impossible the re-
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alisation of other, thicker forms of community in other, related con-
texts. The sources and forms of community are interconnected, and the means of realising and thwarting its many forms, are various;5 while law might be a means of realising and maintaining one such form of community, I hope that is not the only means. Moreover, if we have to rely upon law alone to realise our various ideals of com-
munity, then I think we are in trouble. 
II. Rodrigo’s Questions
These are excellent questions and none of them were raised, never mind answered, in Law’s Judgement which is not to say they are ir-relevant. Rodrigo’s questions are pressing and absolutely pertinent. 
This, I hope, is an accurate paraphrase of the thrust of Rodrigo’s 
first question: are statutory provisions the paradigm instance of 
rules? And, if they are, is it appropriate to speak of law’s abstract 
judgement in a common law legal system, since precedents look 
more like examples than rules, and abstraction is a notion more fit-
ting for rules than for examples? On the first point, my answer is this: 
I don’t think so. My reason is that, along with most common lawyers, I have a rather loose understanding of what rules are: they are usu-
ally relatively general injunctions, although they can of course have 
very specific content, with an ‘internal aspect’ displayed by all who accept the rules.6 Common lawyers are just as happy to speak about 
rules in relation to cases —‘the rule in Rylands v Fletcher’ and ‘the 
rule against perpetuities’—7 as they are to speak about rules in rela-
5  Despite the tidal wave of literature during the last 18 years, one of the best 
starting points for thinking about these matters is still A Mason, Community, Soli-
darity and Belonging (Cambridge University Press 2000). 
6  See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 3rd ed, 2012) at, among many other places, 55-56. For the argument that neither Hart nor other positivists 
properly understood the nature of common law adjudication, which in part echoes 
Rodrigo’s point here, see AWB Simpson, ‘The Common Law and Legal Theory’ in AWB Simpson (ed), Oxford Essays on Jurisprudence, 2nd Series (Clarendon Press 1973) 77-99.
7  For the former, see C Witting, Street on Torts (Clarendon Press, 15th ed, 2018) 
ch 18; on the latter, which is really a series of rules some of which now take statu-
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tion to statutory provisions (as in the ‘rule’ in section 53 (1) (a) of the Law of Property Act 1925 that an interest in land can only be created or disposed of in writing signed by the person creating or disposing of the interest).
Of course, they might be mistaken to do so, although I am not sure 
that their mistake is that common law ‘rules’ are always examples 
while statutory ‘rules’ are always rules. Insofar as the distinction 
between rules and examples rests upon specificity, the former al-
ways being more specific or detailed than the latter, it is dubious: the common law rule (or example) in Rylands v Fletcher is not radi-
cally, qualitatively less specific than that in s 53 (1) (a) of the LPA 1925. If the distinction is instead one that turns upon malleability, the thought being that examples provide more interpretative leeway for followers than rules, then that might be so in some instances. But all propositions are ripe for interpretation, particularly those, 
like propositions of law, that we have to ‘apply’ to the world. As a 
football referee, I have to apply the offside rule. That rule can be ex-plained to me in at least two ways: I can be shown instances of the rule being applied by other referees and I can be given the text of the rule. In each case, there is room for interpretation, questions and 
clarifications. I doubt that there is anything like a qualitative distinc-tion between examples and rules, the difference being at most one of degree.Does this matter for the arguments of Law’s Judgement? It might. 
For if we think there is a bright-line, qualitative distinction between rules and examples, the former always and ever being more detailed 
and less ‘malleable’ than the latter, then abstraction will be easier to achieve through rules than via examples. But I am not persuaded that such a bright-line qualitative distinction exists. 
Rodrigo’s second and third questions raise difficult issues. The problems of implementing the principle of accommodation are the core of his second question and I have no answers to the issues Rodrigo highlights. All I have to say is that he undoubtedly raises the correct issues: cultural accommodation is difficult for law, inso-
tory form, see G Virgo, The Principles of Equity and Trusts (3rd ed, Clarendon Press, 2018) ch 4 at 102-104. 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/
Esta revista forma parte del acervo de la Biblioteca Jurídica Virtual del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM 
https://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/bjv https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/




Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho
Núm. 13, enero-diciembre de 2019, pp. 55-63
60
far as the latter is a regime of general rules (or principles or propo-
sitions). It remains difficult even for a regime of law that displays no 
or few of the marks of LAJ, since the questions of who belongs and how they belong, and of whether or not that type of belonging is 
sufficient to merit legal recognition, are just as pressing there. The Western legal systems have excluded and included different groups 
at different times: animals could once stand trial, but we now think it more appropriate to confer various legal protections upon them; women’s entrance into the domain of legal recognition was, in Eng-
lish law, incremental, full standing perhaps not fully confirmed until 1991.8 These struggles for inclusion and recognition are the stuff of 
everyday political action and, I think, will exist in any kind of legal system. How particular legal systems react to them and, ultimately, 
either accommodate or reject them, is important and interesting.9 
But law should be only one stop in the journey of these recognition struggles and, in my view, not always the most important one, since legal changes alone do not often completely solve the struggles and 
injustices which provoke them. Sovereignty is the fulcrum of Rodrigo’s third question, which I 
think can be paraphrased thus: is LAJ a product of sovereignty in 
the form it exists in the liberal state? That form, as Rodrigo suggests, is this: there is a single and supposedly all-powerful source of law. Certainly, the change from feudal to liberal (or bourgeois, capitalist or mercantile) legal orders was accompanied by changes in the way 
in which public power was envisaged. That was possibly a trans-
formation from the charismatic power of Kings, Queens and Lords 
to the power of the ‘State’, something independent of those whose 
conduct deployed the power ‘it’ unleashed.10 But I’m not sure that 
8  Although falling into a traditional misogynistic trope of lumping women and animals together, I do so only for reasons of time and space. On animals, see EP Ev-ans, The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals (Faber and Faber 1987); for what might be the last step in the process of fully recognising women’s standing in English law, see R v R [1991] 4 ALL ER 481 UKHL. 
9  Note the UK Supreme Court has recently tackled a case very similar to Master-
piece Cakeshop: Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd [2018] UKSC 49. 
10  On the ‘invention’ of the state, see Q Skinner, Visions of Politics Volume II (Cambridge University Press 2002) ch 14. 
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state power has ever and always been reducible to a single sovereign 
source in the Western jurisdictions, many of which are politically 
complex, being amalgams of different cultures, ‘national’ groups and, 
of course, sources of power. Furthermore, this near ‘pluri-sovereign’ reality was seemingly stumbled upon or hinted at by John Austin, albeit as a matter of legal theory. What, after all, is the conclusion of Austin’s search for the sovereign if not this: it’s complicated!11 I 
think that might be Rodrigo’s thought, too, and, if so, I share it. What, then, is the relationship between LAJ and sovereignty? On a properly nuanced and probably complex view of the latter, I’m sure there is an historical, temporal correlation. As yet, I have no clear idea as to the causal or other connections that might underlie that correlation. 
III. Haris’s Tension
Haris takes the tension between LAJ and a range of moral values 
as the core of his comment. The tension is between LAJ’s failure to 
see all that is significant about the conduct and character of those 
it judges and those values which incline us towards an altogether 
more ethically sensitive —or virtuous, for Amalia— mode of judge-
ment. He thinks that, although I offer some arguments to undermine some of the criticisms of LAJ that arise from these values, I never-
theless make too much of this tension. For me, there certainly is a tension; for Haris, there is not (or, as he says, it “is practically non-
existent”). Can our disagreement be resolved? Possibly.One step to accord consists of noting what, exactly, we agree about. Haris and I are certainly in agreement on this issue: that the 
use of rules as a means of guiding and judging conduct always en-tails some degree of abstraction.12 That is because rules qua rules must have some degree of generality and generality always, to some 
degree, overrides particularity. I, like Haris, hold that “abtract judge-
11  See lecture 6 of his The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, edited by W 
Rumble (first published 1832, Cambridge University Press 2009). It is not surpris-
ing that this is by far the longest chapter in the book. 
12  See Law’s Judgement (Hart Publishing 2017) at 16-19.
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ment is a feature of any rule-based mode of action-guidance”. Where 
we might differ, though, is here: I think it is perfectly possible for dif-ferent systems of rule-based action-guidance to display, across each 
system as a whole, different degrees or levels of abstraction. They 
can be, at large, more or less ‘abstract’. One of the contrasts I at-tempted to draw in Law’s Judgement, albeit hastily, was between the level of abstraction displayed by modern legal systems, which mani-fest LAJ, and the English feudal legal systems. My hunch is that the latter was much less abstract than the former, modern law’s embrace of LAJ being one of its most distinctive features.13 Furthermore, the possibility of more or less abstract systems of rule-governed action-guidance is attested by the contributions to this symposium, Haris’s 
view of such systems occupying a very different place on the ‘more or less abstract spectrum’ than Amalia’s view. Of course, if Haris’s view is that there is no such spectrum, that there are simply differ-
ent —in terms of their content— systems of equally abstract judge-
ment, then he would reject this point. But if he accepts it, where else 
might we disagree?  Perhaps on argumentative strategy. Haris is absolutely right to note that my responses to many actual and imagined criticisms of 
LAJ operate at the level of specifics rather than generalities, using my discussion of liability in negligence law as an example. My argu-ment in Law’s Judgement is that this system of liability-responsibil-ity is not unfair or, perhaps more accurately, not as unfair as critics allege. Its moral basis can be found in a not obviously morally mis-
taken system of outcome responsibility. It seems that Haris does not 
disagree with the particulars of that argument, but he does find it 
a little petty-fogging or trivial. He thinks that “a response to... crit-ics in light of the generals rather than the particulars of LAJ would 
be more apt and effective”. Haris might well be right about that and 
he seems well placed to take up that issue himself. But I have what could be a partial defence for this approach, although some might regard it as no defence at all. 
13  Ibid 19-21. For a fascinating discussion of feudal legality, see Rio, A “Half-Free’ Categories in the Early Middle Ages: Fine Distinctions Before Professional Lawyers’, ch 5 of P Dresch & J Schiele (eds), Legalism: Rules and Categories (Claren-don Press 2015). 
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It is this: LAJ is hard to talk about in the abstract. One reason for that is that it is there, right in front of our (contemporary or modern lawyers) noses. So close, indeed, that we almost can’t see it. Fur-thermore, not only is it so close, it is also very nearly ubiquitous, albeit not in the sense of being always and ever explicitly in play: 
its absence is often as telling as its presence, making lawyers suspi-cious of law’s so narrowly drafted that they all but name a person, 
group or class or bodies of law that lack systematicity or generality. A good way of bringing this very close but not quite ubiquitous fea-ture of the modern legal landscape into focus is to point to particular 
instances or aspects of it. That is how I began Law’s Judgement and how, as Haris notes, I respond to a few of the arguments offered by 
jurists against LAJ. 
One could dub this a ‘bottom up’ approach, the ‘bottom’ being par-
ticular juridical instances of LAJ. The usual contrast is with a ‘top-down’ approach which was characterised thus by Jules Coleman: “In 
top down explanations, the theorist begins with what she takes to 
be the set of norms that would gain our reflective acceptance... Then 
she looks at the body of law... and tries to reconstruct it plausibly as exemplifying those norms. Parts of the law... may fail to be plausibly 
reconstructed... and identified as mistakes”.14 I do not think that one approach or the other is always obviously better nor do I believe that there is an a priori truth here to guide us. If Haris accepts that too, then the only thing that sets us apart is our different approaches to LAJ. That counts as a genuine difference but it is not, I think, one which will yield a great substantive divergence, generating radically incompatible accounts of LAJ’s value.    
14  Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge University Press 1992) 8. Coleman’s point of contrast is not bottom-up approaches but middle-level theory: ibid. In what seems 
like a previous life I complained about both: see section III of my ‘Rethinking the Common Law’ (1994) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 539-564. 
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